















Wolfram F. Richter 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2969 
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
ORIGINAL VERSION: FEBRUARY 2010 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labor, education, and saving, 
efficient education policy is characterized for a Ramsey-like scenario in which the 
government is constrained to use linear instruments. It is shown that education should be 
effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in 
education. The strength of second-best subsidization increases in the elasticity of the elasticity 
of the earnings function. This second-order elasticity rule extends the well-known Ramsey-
Boiteux inverse elasticity rule. 
JEL-Code: H21, I28, J24. 
Keywords: endogenous choice of education, second-best efficient taxation, linear instruments, 







Wolfram F. Richter 
TU Dortmund University 








Forthcoming in FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis. 
Helpful comments of two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.   2
1. Introduction 
The inverse elasticity rule states that optimally chosen commodity tax rates should be 
inversely related to the price elasticities of demand. The rule is usually attributed to Ramsey 
(1927), but a structurally equivalent formula was derived independently by Boiteux (1956) for 
the problem of optimal monopoly pricing. The assumptions underlying optimal taxation in 
Ramsey’s tradition have been criticized from a conceptual point of view. Still, there will be no 
introductory course in optimal taxation that does not mention the rule. This paper 
demonstrates how the rule has to be extended if it is to guide efficient education policy in 
Ramsey’s tradition. It is shown that the standard role taken by the elasticity of demand or 
supply has to be replaced with the elasticity of elasticity – also called second-order elasticity 
in what follows – if the rule is to apply to education. The extended rule calls for subsidizing 
education effectively if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in 
education. In particular, the strength of subsidization should increase in the function’s second-
order elasticity.  
This note is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative taxpayer. 
Section 3 derives the extended elasticity rule for education. Section 4 provides the proof.  
 
2. A Representative-Household Model 
The model is taken from Richter (2009). It assumes a representative taxpayer living for two 
periods and deriving strictly increasing utility U from consumption  i C  and strictly decreasing 
disutility from nonleisure time  i L  in periods i=1,2. The function U= 1212 (, ,,) UCC LL  is 
strictly quasi-concave.  2 L  is identical with the second-period labor supply. By contrast, only 
1 LE −  is time spent in the market, while E is time spent on education. The first-period labor 
supply earns a constant wage rate  1 ω ; the return to second-period labor depends on the 
amount of education. It is paid  2 () HE ω , where  2 ω  is constant while the earnings function 
H(E) displays positive but diminishing returns, H′>0>H′′. The quantity  2 L  is interpreted as 
qualified labor. Likewise, the quantities  1 LE −  and  1 L  are interpreted as nonqualified labor 
and nonqualified nonleisure, respectively. Education causes an opportunity cost in forgone 
earnings and a monetary cost of tuition. Both costs are assumed to be linear in time. The cost 
of foregone earnings is denoted by  1 ω E, and the cost of tuition is denoted by  E ϕ . The share 
of first-period income that is spent neither on education nor on consumption is saved:   3
  11 1 1 1 1 1 () () SL E E C L E C ω ϕω ω ϕ =− − − = − + −       (1) 
By way of normalization, the price of consumption is set equal to one. The gross rate of return 
to saving is denoted by ρ . Second-period consumption is constrained by income earned: 
  22 2 () CSH E L ρ ω =+           ( 2 )  
Substituting for S in (1) and (2) yields the lifetime budget constraint: 
  12 1 12 2 1 /( ) / ( ) CC L H E L E ρ ωω ρ ϕ ω += + − +       (3) 
The sole objective of this note is to extend the inverse elasticity rule to education. For this 
purpose consideration is restricted to utility functions that are quasilinear in first-period 
consumption and additive in periodic sub-utilities: 
  1212 (, ,,) UCC LL  =  11 1 2 2 () (, ) CV L U C L −+        ( 4 )  
The function  1 V  is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The representative taxpayer 
maximizes (4) in  1212 ,, ,, 0 CCLLE ≥  subject to  1 LE ≥  and (3). In what follows it is assumed 
that this maximization is well behaved. This means that there exists an interior unique 
solution that is differentiable in  12 ,, , ω ωρ ϕ  and that the second-order conditions are fulfilled. 
The first-order conditions are 
 
'
11 1 () VL ω = ,    1/ C U ρ = ,            ( 5 )  
  2 () / L UH E ω ρ +  = 0,    22 1 '( ) / HE L ω ρωϕ = + .      (6) 
The following example satisfies all the assumptions needed in the present study: 
•  0 () HE h E H
η ≡+   with  0 h > ,  1 η > >0,   0 H ≥ 0,      (7) 
•  22 2 22 (,) () () C UC L u C V L ≡−   with 
'
2 0 V > , 
and some elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor which is sufficiently large at the second-
best level of  2 L : 
• 
"'
22 2 2 // ( 1 ) LV V ν ηη ≡> −          ( 8 )  
The case of an increasing elasticity of the earnings function,  '/ EH H η ≡ , will play a 
prominent role in the following discussion of second-best policy. Because 
η = 0 (1 / ( )) HH E η − , the specification (7) provides an example of an earnings function 
featuring an increasing elasticity,  '0 η > , if and only if  0 H >0. The inequality (8) is needed to   4
ensure that the second-order conditions of the taxpayer’s maximization are fulfilled. This can 
be verified as follows. Let  
  22 2 1 ()m a x [ / ( ) ]
E YL H L E ω ρωϕ ≡− +  
be the ability-rent income. The second-order condition with respect to  2 L  requires 
  0  >  
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2 " YV −   
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This follows from (8) and (7). 
 
3. Second-Best Policy 
The government faces the need to raise an exogenous amount of revenue G. Four linear tax 
instruments are available, each of which is distorting. The taxes are levied on period i’s labor 
income, on the return to saving, and on the cost of tuition. They are modeled implicitly as the 
difference between prices before and after taxes. The prices after taxes and subsidies are 
endogenous and denoted by  12 ,, , ω ωρ ϕ . The prices before taxes and subsidies are exogenous 
and denoted by  12 ,, , wwrf . Little would change if the wage rate of qualified labor,  2 w , were 
normalized to one. By way of contrast, the wage rate after tax and subsidy,  2 ω , cannot be 
normalized, as it is determined endogenously. The tax on period i’s labor income is modeled 
by  ii w ω − , the tax on capital income by r ρ − , and the tax on the cost of tuition by  f ϕ − . It 
goes without saying that each tax can well take on a negative value so that it is effectively a 
subsidy. Government’s net revenue has to balance the budget: 
  11 1 () ( ) ( ) wL E f E ω ϕ −− + − + 22 2 [( ) ( ) ( ) ]/ wH E L r S r ω ρ − +−  





− ] 2 HL +[
11
r ρ
− ] 2 C  = G.   (9) 
The planner maximizes the representative taxpayer’s utility (4) in the quantities 
1212 ,,,, CCLLE  and prices  12 ,, , ω ωρ ϕ  subject to the behavioral constraints (3), (5), (6), and 
the budget constraint (9). Assume that the planner’s maximization is well behaved. The sole   5
objective of this note is to characterize efficient policy for education in relation to the taxation 
of nonqualified labor. 
Efficiency is characterized in terms of wedges. Denote by  
 






  the wedge on nonqualified labor, and by      (10) 
  E Δ  ≡ 
22 1
1















  the wedge on education.   (11) 
According to (11), the wedge on education equals the difference between two ratios. The first 
ratio relates present returns before and after taxes and subsidies, and the second ratio relates 
costs before and after taxes and subsidies. Hence the wedge vanishes if the ratio of returns 
equals the ratio in costs. Let us speak of effective subsidization if  E Δ  is negative. According to 
(11), a negative value of  E Δ  is the combined result of all four policy instruments. Effective 
subsidization is clearly reached by the statutory subsidization of the cost of tuition. This is 
however not the only way of reducing  E Δ . Other effective means are (i) increasing the tax on 
nonqualified labor and thus reducing the opportunity cost of education, (ii) reducing the tax 
on qualified labor and thus increasing the return to education, and finally (iii) taxing saving 
and thus increasing the return to education.  
Denote by   
  1 ν  ≡ 
"'
11 1 / LV V  > 0 
the elasticity of marginal disutility of nonqualified labor, i.e., the reciprocal of the wage 
elasticity, and by  
  η η  ≡ '/ Eη η  
the second-order elasticity of the earnings function. 
 











  .         ( 1 2 )  
   6
Note that the rule holds even if the planner does not optimize with respect to ρ . Saving does 
not need to be taxed efficiently, and yet education policy should respect (12). A 
straightforward implication is that education should not be distorted ( E Δ =0) if the elasticity of 
the earnings function, η , is constant. This is a well-known result, also named the education 
efficiency proposition (Richter, 2009). It had been derived before in more elaborate models 
with heterogeneous taxpayers by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2008). Another implication of (12) is that education should be subsidized if the elasticity of 
the earnings function is increasing. 
Related results have been derived by Braun (2009) and Richter (2009). What has been lacking 
so far is the simple elasticity formula (12), which allows one to characterize efficient 
subsidization by means of the second-order elasticity of the earnings function. For the purpose 
of interpreting (12), assume that nonqualified labor income is taxed (
1 L Δ >0) and that the 
elasticity of the earnings function is increasing. Then (12) suggests that the second-best tax on 
(nonqualified) labor should vary inversely with the wage elasticity. This is the known part of 
the elasticity rule. The innovative part is the suggestion that the effective subsidization of 
education should increase monotonically in the second-order elasticity of education. 
The recommendation to effectively subsidize education raises the question of how to translate 
it into specific tax and subsidy rates. Unfortunately, no simple formula exists for the Ramsey 
framework. As one may well suppose, the efficient set of tax and subsidy rates strongly 
depends on the specification of the taxpayer’s utility function. There is only one known robust 
result. This states that qualified labor should be less distorted than nonqualified labor (Richter, 
2009). It holds for arbitrary utility and earnings functions. 
 
4. Proof 
The proof is fairly straightforward. Start by simplifying the planner’s problem. Replace  1 ω  by 
'
1 V , and drop the constraint  1/ C U ρ =  because the proof does not rely on any derivatives with 
respect to  22 ,, CL ρ . The restated planner’s problem is: 
 max  [
''
11 1 2 2 1 1 () () / ( () ) LV L H E L V L E ωρ ϕ +− + 11 22 2 () (, ) / VL UCL C ρ − +− ] (13) 
in  12 ,,, LE ϕ ω  subject to 
  22 2 (,) ( ) / L UCL H E ω ρ +  = 0 ,        (λ )    (14)   7
'
22 1 1 '( ) / ( ) HE L VL ωρ ϕ =+   ,      (μ )    (15) 
''






− ) 2 () HEL +[
11
r ρ
− ] 2 C   =  G. (γ )    (16) 










11 () wV γ −
(17) =
"









:  12 2 [' / ] f ww H Lr γ +−
(17),(19) = (1 ) γ − [
'
12 2 2 2 '/ " / VH L H E L ϕ ηω ρ ω ρ +− + ] 
  








1 V ϕ + ) = (1 ) γ −
' Eη
η
( 1 ϕ ω + ).    (20) 
The Lagrange multiplier γ  is clearly positive. The multiplier γ  has to be greater than one if 
1 w  is to exceed 
'
11 V ω = . Dividing (18) by 
'
1 V  and (20) by  1 ϕ ω +  and dividing the resulting 
equation (20) by the resulting equation (18) yields (12). 
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